All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof

For division problems with single-peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy-proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi ; Neme, Alejandro
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 18.2023, 3, p. 1023-1061
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	division problems \| Obvious strategy-proofness \| sequential allotment rules \| single-peaked preferences

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE5111 [DOI] 1856109690 [GVK] RePEc:the:publsh:5111 [RePEc]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536890