All voting is strategic
All voting is strategic because the shared outcomes are note within the choice set of any voter, the elements of which can only be strategies. Voting behavior need not re- flect the individual's ordering of outcomes, and the conventional distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting is misguided. In voting choice, the ordinal ranking of outcomes must be supplemented by intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among these outcomes and also by predictions concerning the behavior of other participants in the nexus of interdependence. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Buchanan, James ; Yoon, Yong |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 129.2006, 1, p. 159-167
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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