Alliances électorales entre deux tours de scrutin. Le point de vue de la théorie des jeux coopératifs et une application aux élections régionales de mars 2010

In the article, we use two major solutions in cooperative game theory ?the Shapley value and the nucleolus? to study electoral bargaining in the electoral environment characterizing the French Regional elections of March 2010. Classification JEL : D71, D72

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Breton, Michel Le ; Straeten, Karine Van der
Published in:	Revue économique. - Presses de Sciences-Po. - Vol. 64.2013, 2, p. 173-240
Publisher:	Presses de Sciences-Po

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010854233