Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 36.2005, 2, p. 318-336
|
Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Subject: | Organizational Behavior | Transaction Costs | Property Rights Organization of Production Management of Technological Innovation and R&D contract theory | hidden action | limited liability | moral hazard |
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