Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ambrus, Attila ; Lu, Shih En |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 88.2014, p. 174-189
|
Subject: | Imperfect information | Cheap talk | Multi-senders | Communication | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Kommunikation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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