Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf Values.
In a paper in 1975, Dubey characterized the Shapley-Shubik index axiomatically on the class of monotonic simple games. In 1979, Dubey and Shapley characterized the Banzhaf index in a similar way. This paper extends these characterizations to axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values on the class of control games, on the class of simple games and on the class of all transferable utility games. In particular, it is shown that the additivity axiom which is usually used to characterize these values on the class of all transferable utility games can be weakened without changing the result.
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Feltkamp, Vincent |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 24.1995, 2, p. 179-86
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bird's tree allocations revisited
Feltkamp, Vincent, (1994)
-
The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
Arin, Javier, (1994)
-
Linear production with transport of products, resources and technology
Feltkamp, Vincent, (1993)
- More ...