Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
Kojima and Ünver (forthcoming) are the first to characterize the class of mechanisms coinciding with the Boston mechanism for some priority order. By mildly strengthening their central axiom, we are able to pin down the Boston mechanism outcome for every priority order. Our main result shows that a mechanism is outcome equivalent to the Boston mechanism at every priority if and only if it respects both preference rankings and priorities and satisfies individual rationality for schools. In environments where each student is acceptable to every school, respecting both preference rankings and priorities is enough to characterize the Boston mechanism.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz |
Published in: |
Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 66.2013, 2, p. 176-179
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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