Alternative solutions to the odious debt problem

Mitu Gulati (Duke Law School), Ugo Panizza (Graduate Institute, Geneva & CEPR)

The doctrine of state succession requires that governments honor the international commitments of their predecessors. Even if a dictator borrows to oppress his own citizens, future generations are required to service the debts and commitments contracted by the dictator. This paper starts by briefly describing possible exceptions to this doctrine by focusing on war and hostile debts. Next, the paper reviews the literature on odious debt and discusses two proposals that could address this issue by using domestic legal principles.

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Year of publication:	February 2020
Authors:	Gulati, Mitu ; Panizza, Ugo
Publisher:	Geneva, Switzerland : Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, International Economics Department
Subject:	Odious Debt \| Sovereign Default Sovereign Debt \| Internationale Staatsschulden \| International sovereign debt \| Öffentliche Schulden \| Public debt \| Staatsbankrott \| Sovereign default \| Umschuldung \| Debt restructuring

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten)
Series:	Working paper / Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. - Genève : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2523350-6. - Vol. no. HEIDWP2020, 02
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/230327 [Handle]
Classification:	G15 - International Financial Markets ; H63 - Debt; Debt Management ; K34 - Tax Law ; O54 - Latin America; Caribbean
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012164685