Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly.
A study of the optimal behavior of a public firm in a market where there are also n private firms. The public firm aims at maximizing a social welfare function while the private firms aim at maximizing profit. The authors compare four possible regimes: (1) the public firm is a welfare maximizing Stackelberg leader; (2) it is a welfare maximizing Cournot-Nash player; (3) it is a profit maximizer (pure oligopoly); and (4) the whole industry is under government control (nationalization). When the number of firms is sufficiently large, the optimal strategy of a welfare maximizing firm is to act as if it wanted to maximize its profit. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | de Fraja, Giovanni ; Delbono, Flavio |
Published in: |
Oxford Economic Papers. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 41.1989, 2, p. 302-11
|
Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Welfare Maximizing Oligopolist
De Fraja, Giovanni, (1986)
-
De Fraja, Giovanni, (1988)
-
Recenti sviluppi nell'analisi degli oligopoli misti
De Fraja, Gianni, (1993)
- More ...