Altruism and envy in contests : an evolutionarily stable symbiosis

Kai A. Konrad

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A.
Publisher:	Munich : Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.]
Subject:	Altruismus \| Altruism \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Theorie \| Theory \| Neid \| Envy \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Evolutionary game theory \| Egoismus \| Gleichgewicht \| Spieltheorie

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Extent:	18 S
Series:	CESifo working papers : the international platform of Ludwig-Maximilians University's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Munich : CESifo, ISSN 1617-9595, ZDB-ID 2023380-2. - Vol. 825
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Internetausg.: http://www.cesifo.de/pls/ifo_app/DocLinkCESifoDl?getDoc=cesifo_wp825.pdf Literaturverz. S. 17 - 18
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D64 - Altruism ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001737581