Amalgamating players, symmetry and the Banzhaf value

We suggest new characterizations of the Banzhaf value without the symmetry axiom, which reveal that the characterizations by Lehrer (1988, International Journal of Game Theory 17, 89-99) and Nowak (1997, International Journal of Game Theory 26, 127-141) as well as most of the characterizations by Casajus (2010, Theory and Decision, forthcoming) are redundant. Further, we explore symmetry implications of Lehrer's 2-efficiency axiom.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Casajus, André
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Shapley-Wert \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Theorie \| Banzhaf value \| amalgamation \| symmetry \| 2-efficiency

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Series:	Working Papers ; 442
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	641918291 [GVK] hdl:10419/43802 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285420