An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Andersson, Tommy ; Ehlers, Lars H. |
Published in: |
International journal of economic theory. - Richmond, Victoria : Wiley Publishing Asia, ISSN 1742-7363, ZDB-ID 2182356-X. - Vol. 18.2022, 1, p. 50-60
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Subject: | algorithm | budget-balance | envy-freeness | least manipulable | Theorie | Theory | Algorithmus | Algorithm | Allokation | Allocation | Manipulation | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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