An Allegory of the Political Influence of the Top 1%
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | De Donder, Philippe ; Roemer, John E. |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | political economy | Kantian equilibrium | lobbying | regulatory capture |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 4478 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 773874127 [GVK] hdl:10419/89738 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_4478 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; H31 - Household |
Source: |
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