An allegory of the political influence of the top 1%
Year of publication: |
2013-11
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Authors: | De Donder, Philippe ; Roemer, John |
Institutions: | Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) |
Subject: | kantian equilibrium | lobbying | political economy and regulatory capture |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series TSE Working Paper Number 13-455 |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H31 - Household |
Source: |
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An allegory of the political influence of the top 1%
De Donder, Philippe, (2013)
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