An allocatively efficient auction market for payment entitlements?
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Nielsen, Kurt ; Nielsen, Jesper Troelsgaard |
Published in: |
Acta agriculturae Scandinavica / C : an official journal of the Nordic Association of Agricultural Scientists (NJF). - Stockholm : Taylor & Francis, ISSN 1650-7541, ZDB-ID 2116892-1. - Vol. 7.2010, 1, p. 44-54
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Subject: | Interrelated valuation | double auction | Walrasian tatonnement | decoupled agricultural subsidies | Agrarsubvention | Agricultural subsidy | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Auktion | Auction | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Experiment |
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