An Auction Model of Intellectual Property Protection: Patent Versus Copyright
In this paper several firms compete for the right to obtain intellectual property protection for a basic idea which has subsequent potential applications. The modelling employs an auction analogy, taking the context to be an n-player all-pay auction, with a reserve. We find that, even taking only firms' own utilities into account, welfare has no interior maximum, so that either maximal, or minimal, protection is optimal. Through examining a simple version of this game, we suggest that software is socially better protected by means of copyright rather than patent.
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | WATERSON, Michael ; IRELAND, Norman |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 1998, 49-50, p. 247-263
|
Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Ireland, Norman J., (2006)
-
An auction model of intellectual property protection : patent versus copyright
Waterson, Michael, (2000)
-
An auction model of intellectual property protection : patent versus copyright
Waterson, Michael, (1998)
- More ...