An Austro-Libertarian Critique of Public Choice

Front Cover -- Half Title -- Editorial Advisory Board -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Part 1: What Is Austrian Economics? -- Chapter 1 The Subjectivist Roots of James Buchanan's Economics -- Chapter 2 Cultural Dynamics -- Part 2: The Austrian Critique of Public Choice -- Chapter 3 Competition and Political Entrepreneurship: Austrian Insights into Public-Choice Theory -- Chapter 4 Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics -- Chapter 5 George Stigler and the Myth of Efficient Government -- Part 3: The Austrian Response to The Calculus of Consent -- Chapter 6 The Calculus of Consent Revisited -- Chapter 7 Buchanan and Tullock's "The Calculus of Consent" -- Chapter 8 Constitutional Economics and the Calculus of Consent -- Part 4: Austrians and Public Choicers on Antitrust -- Chapter 9 The Truth about Sherman -- Chapter 10 The Myth of Natural Monopoly -- Chapter 11 Monopolistic Competition and Macroeconomic Theory by Robert Solow -- Chapter 12 The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective -- Chapter 13 Total Repeal of Antitrust Legislation: A Critique of Bork, Brozen, and Posner -- Part 5: Rent Seeking -- Chapter 14 Property Rights, Information Costs, and the Economics of Rent Seeking -- Chapter 15 All Government is Excessive: A Rejoinder to Dwight Lee's "In Defense of Excessive Government" -- Chapter 16 Watch Your Language -- Part 6: Taxation -- Chapter 17 Utility Profits, Fiscal Illusion, and Local Public Expenditures -- Chapter 18 The Expenditure Effects of Restricting Competition in Local Public Service Industries: The Case of Special Districts -- Chapter 19 The Justification for Taxation in the Public Finance Literature: An Unorthodox View -- Part 7: Other Topics in Public Choice -- Chapter 20 A Constitutionalist Approach to Social Security Reform.