An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution
Year of publication: |
2013-06-14
|
---|---|
Authors: | Llerena, Francesc ; Vilella, Cori |
Published in: |
Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 33.2013, 2, p. 1438-1445
|
Publisher: |
AccessEcon |
Subject: | Cooperative TU-game | strong constrained egalitarian solution | axiomatization |
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