An Axiomatic Model of Persuasion
A sender ranks information structures knowing that a receiver processes the information before choosing an action affecting them both. The sender and receiver may differ in their utility functions and/or prior beliefs, yielding a model of dynamic inconsistency when they represent the same individual at two points in time. I take as primitive (i) a collection of preference orderings over all information structures, indexed by menus of acts (the sender's ex ante preferences for information), and (ii) a collection of correspondences over menus of acts, indexed by signals (the receiver's signalâcontingent choice(s) from menus). I provide axiomatic representation theorems characterizing the sender as a sophisticated planner and the receiver as a Bayesian information processor, and show that all parameters can be uniquely identified from the sender's preferences for information. I also establish a series of results characterizing common priors, common utility functions, and intuitive measures of disagreement for these parametersâall in terms of the sender's preferences for information.
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Jakobsen, Alexander M. |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - The Econometric Society, ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 89.2021, 5, p. 2081-2116
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Publisher: |
The Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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