An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi ; Tanaka, Makoto |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 19.2002, 4, p. 751-761
|
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory | Wissenschaftliche Methode | Scientific method |
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