An economic analysis of debarment
Year of publication: |
June 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Auriol, Emmanuelle ; Søreide, Tina |
Published in: |
International review of law and economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0144-8188, ZDB-ID 704902-X. - Vol. 50.2017, p. 36-49
|
Subject: | Corruption | Collusion | Procurement | Korruption | Theorie | Theory | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Kartell | Cartel | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Anti-Korruption | Anti-corruption |
-
"An economic analysis of debarment"
Auriol, Emmanuelle, (2015)
-
Preventing collusion in procurement
Albano, Gian Luigi, (2006)
-
Asymmetry and collusion in sequential procurement : a “large lot last” policy
Albano, Gian Luigi, (2010)
- More ...
-
An economic analysis of debarment
Auriol, Emmanuelle, (2015)
-
"An economic analysis of debarment"
Auriol, Emmanuelle, (2015)
-
An Economic Analysis of Debarment
Auriol, Emmanuelle, (2015)
- More ...