An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations
There has been considerable interest in recent years in the question of issue linkages in international negotiations. What is significant about discussions of linkages in the present era is the stress put on making trade-offs explicit among issues. Most of the highly publicized cases of proposed issue linkages appear to have been motivated by attempts of individual countries or groups of countries to extend their dominant bargaining or veto power in one particular issue area into other areas so as to achieve maximum advantage from their whole array of international interactions. The existence of an additional rationale for linkage that relies upon mutual interest has important implications. Drawing on the economic theory of exchange, the use of issue linkages to facilitate the completion of a greater number of mutually beneficial agreements among nations is considered.
Year of publication: |
1979
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tollison, Robert D. ; Willett, Thomas D. |
Published in: |
International Organization. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 33.1979, 04, p. 425-449
|
Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
A defense of the CEA as an instrument for giving economic policy advice
Tollison, Robert D., (1976)
-
An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations
Tollison, Robert D., (1979)
-
An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations
Tollison, Robert D., (1984)
- More ...