An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Crémer, Jacques ; Palfrey, Thomas R. |
Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 90.2006, 10/11, p. 2091-2106
|
Subject: | Föderalismus | Federalism | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory |
-
A federal voting mechanism to solve the fiscal-externality problem
Piketty, Thomas, (1996)
-
Environmental tax reform in a federation with rent-induced migration
Garon, Jean-Denis, (2015)
-
Campaign contributions and local public goods in a federation
Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl A., (2018)
- More ...
-
Federal mandates by popular demand
Crémer, Jacques, (2000)
-
In or out? : Centralization by majority vote
Crémer, Jacques, (1996)
-
Federal mandates with local agenda setters
Crémer, Jacques, (2002)
- More ...