An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens
We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, and the groups' composition are also done.
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Landi, M. ; Sodini, M. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889. - Vol. 36.2012, 10, p. 1431-1447
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Turnout | Coordination games | Poisson games | Conformism | Selection dynamics |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by subject
-
An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout With Conformist Citizens
Landi, Massimiliano, (2010)
-
Landi, Massimiliano, (2010)
-
An evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens
Landi, M., (2012)
- More ...
Similar items by person