An examination of the market for favors and votes in congress
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Groseclose, Tim |
Published in: |
Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic Association International. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0095-2583, ZDB-ID 191139-9. - Vol. 34.1996, 2, p. 320-340
|
Subject: | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmung | Voting | Schätzung | Estimation | USA | United States | 1989 |
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