An exercise in political economy of tax reform
If the tax rate is endogenously determined by majority voting, then a fully effective and costless reform resulting in full tax compliance may not be supported by a majority even when the evaders (or, avoiders) are only a minority.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Evrenk, Haldun |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 105.2009, 1, p. 81-82
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Political support Tax reform Majority voting |
Saved in:
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