An experimental test of the global-game selection in coordination games with asymmetric players
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Heinemann, Frank |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1879-1751, ZDB-ID 1460618-5. - Vol. 218.2024, p. 632-656
|
Subject: | Coordination games | Equilibrium selection | Global game | Laplacian beliefs | Level-K | Network effects | Private information | Quantal response equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Experiment | Koordination | Coordination |
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