An Exploration of Reputation Formation in Experimental Games.

This paper presents results from experiments with finitely repeated games with complete and incomplete information. We use two treatment variables: the number of rounds the game is played and the value of the probability that reflects the presence of incomplete information.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Brandts, J. ; Figueras, N.
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| INFORMATION

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Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	43 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572232