An extensive form solution to the adverse selection problem in principal multi-agent environments
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Duggan, John |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 3.1998, 2, p. 167-191
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
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