An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.

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Year of publication:	2011-04
Authors:	Cabrales, Antonio ; Lugo, Haydée
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	efficiency \| lotteries \| public good \| warm glow

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 8319
Classification:	D64 - Altruism ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921774