An incentive mechanism for private parking-sharing programs in an imperfect information setting
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Yan, Pengyu ; Cai, Xiaoqiang ; Chu, Feng ; Ni, Debing ; He, Heng |
Published in: |
Service science. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 2164-3970, ZDB-ID 2658448-7. - Vol. 15.2023, 1, p. 3-21
|
Subject: | incentive compatibility | mechanism design | parking sharing | truth-telling pricing | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy |
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