An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

Fuad Aleskerov; Daniel Karabekyan; M. Remzi Sanver; Vyacheslav Yakuba

We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives. -- manipulability ; positional voting rules ; multiple choice ; extended preferences

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Aleskerov, Fuad T. ; Karabekyan, Daniel ; Sanver, M. Remzi ; Yakuba, Vyacheslav
Published in:	SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1869-4195, ZDB-ID 2536381-5. - Vol. 2.2011, 4, p. 431-446
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	graph. Darst.
Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzung Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s13209-011-0050-y [DOI] hdl:10419/77764 [Handle]
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505656