An Integration of Trade Union Models in a Sequential Bargaining Framework.
This paper aims to embed two popular models of trade union behavior, the monopoly model and the efficient bargaining model, in a more general framework. It does this by analyzing sequential bargaining models where wages are determined before employment and the power of the union in the two stages of the bargain differs. As well as finding that the monopoly and efficient bargain models are special cases of this model, a new class of models is also discovered. This framework is used to analyze the relationship between union pow er and efficiency, the empirical analysis of trade unions, and the effects of trade union legislation. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1987
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Authors: | Manning, Alan |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 97.1987, 385, p. 121-39
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
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