An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games

For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with a nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is at most n-1, where n is the number of players. This bound exploits the geometry of the core and is optimal. It considerably improves the upper bounds found so far by Koczy (2006), Yang (2010, 2011) and a previous result by ourselves (2012) in which the bound was n(n-1)/2.

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Year of publication:	2012-05-23
Authors:	Béal, Sylvain ; Rémila, Eric ; Solal, Philippe
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Core \| Block \| Weak dominance relation \| Strong dominance relation \| Davis-Maschler reduced games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108416