An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Schmidt, Robert ; Pollrich, Martin ; Stiel, Caroline |
Institutions: | Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; L51 - Economics of Regulation |
Source: |
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