Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
Year of publication: |
October 2016
|
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Authors: | Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; Cerreia-Vioglio, S. ; Maccheroni, Fabio ; Marinacci, Massimo |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 66.2016, p. 40-51
|
Subject: | Selfconfirming equilibrium | Conjectural equilibrium | Information feedback | Ambiguity aversion | Partially specified probabilities | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
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