Announcement wars as an equilibrium selection device
Year of publication: |
2009-12-01
|
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Authors: | ACOCELLA, Nicola ; DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni ; HUGHES HALLETT, Andrew ; PIACQUADIO, Paolo G. |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | multiple Nash equilibria | coordination failure | cheap talk | policy games | announcement equilibrium |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2009077 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis |
Source: |
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