Anonymity in Nonatomic Games

In nonatomic games, anonymity must be assumed in order to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This can be formalized by making payoffs dependent either on the players' distribution on the action set or on the strategy mean. An extension of Rath's (1992) proof to the case of limited anonymity is proposed: the behavior of the population as a whole, is shown sufficient to get equilibrium existence in pure strategies.

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Year of publication:	2002-08
Authors:	Rocco, Lorenzo
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia, Metodi Quantitativi e Strategie d'Impresa (DEMS), Facoltà di Economia

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 53 30 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005198706