Anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric majority rules

In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumptions that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders over the set of alternatives, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric rules and for the existence of anonymous, neutral, reversal symmetric majority rules

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013-10
Authors:	Bubboloni, Daniela ; Gori, Michele
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, Università degli Studi di Firenze
Subject:	Social welfare function \| anonymity \| neutrality \| reversal symmetry \| majority \| linear order \| group theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers - Mathematical Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2013-05 24 pages
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201346