Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S. |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 128.2015, C, p. 79-82
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Social choice rules | Condorcet | Anonymity | Neutrality | Strategy-proofness |
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