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Anti-Sharing.

Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti- Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.
Authors: Kirstein, Roland ; Cooter, Robert
Institutions: Berkeley Electronic Press
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application/pdf
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Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
oai:bepress: The text is part of a series German Working Papers in Law and Economics Number 2005-1-1131
Classification: D - Microeconomics ; L - Industrial Organization ; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086898
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