Anti-Sharing

Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Kirstein, Roland ; Cooter, Robert
Publisher:	Saarbrücken : Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
Subject:	team production \| sharing problem \| bonding \| theory of the firm

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Series:	CSLE Discussion Paper ; 2005-03
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	487989651 [GVK] hdl:10419/23074 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:csledp:200503 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L23 - Organization of Production ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296922