Anti-Teilen in Teams
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Kirstein, Roland |
Publisher: |
Saarbrücken : Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE) |
Subject: | Gruppenarbeit | Erfolgsbeteiligung | Leistungsmotivation | Anreizvertrag | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Theorie | Strategische Komplemente | Teilungsproblem | Anti-Insurance |
Series: | CSLE Discussion Paper ; 2004-04 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | German |
Other identifiers: | 387518169 [GVK] hdl:10419/23045 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:csledp:200404 [RePEc] |
Classification: | M21 - Business Economics ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights |
Source: |
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Kirstein, Roland, (2004)
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Kirstein, Roland, (2005)
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Kirstein, Roland, (2004)
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