Antitrust and Regulation
Dennis W. Carlton, Randal C. Picker
Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points
Year of publication: |
February 2007
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Authors: | Carlton, Dennis W. |
Other Persons: | Picker, Randal C. (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Regulierung | Regulation | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Politische Kultur | Political culture |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w12902 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w12902 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465754