Appointments of outsiders as CEOs, state-owned enterprises, and firm performance: Evidence from China

We study CEO successions in China and focus on the decision to appoint outsiders as CEOs. In doing so, we also differentiate our sample into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and non-SOEs. We find that firm-specific factors can predict external successions for SOEs, but not for non-SOEs. Further, for those SOEs that choose outsiders as CEOs for firm-specific reasons, their subsequent firm performance improves.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Jiang, Fuxiu ; Huang, Jicheng ; Kim, Kenneth A.
Published in:	Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. - Elsevier, ISSN 0927-538X. - Vol. 23.2013, C, p. 49-64
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	CEO succession \| State-owned enterprise \| China

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636100