Approximate efficiency in repeated games with correlated private signals
This paper presents repeated games with hidden moves, in which players receive imperfect private signals and are able to communicate. We propose a conditional probability approach to solve the learning problem in repeated games with correlated private signals and delayed communication. We then apply this approach to symmetric n-player games to obtain an approximate efficiency result.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Zheng, Bingyong |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 63.2008, 1, p. 406-416
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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