Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games
We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games, including games without analytically tractable solutions. Finally, we illustrate the flexibility of the CSE approximation with a series of auction examples, including a complex multi-unit auction. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Armantier, Olivier ; Florens, Jean-Pierre ; Richard, Jean-Francois |
Published in: |
Journal of Applied Econometrics. - John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.. - Vol. 23.2008, 7, p. 965-981
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Publisher: |
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Saved in:
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