Are CFO debt-like compensation incentives associated with financial reporting quality?
Mark Kohlbeck, Xin Luo
| Year of publication: |
2019
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Kohlbeck, Mark ; Luo, Xin |
| Published in: |
Advances in accounting : a research annual. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0882-6110, ZDB-ID 722244-0. - Vol. 45.2019, 100413, p. 1-10
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| Subject: | CFO debt-like compensation incentive | Agency theory | Mutual monitoring | Financial reporting quality | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Jahresabschluss | Financial statement | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.adiac.2019.03.001 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064597