Are debt and incentive compensation substitutes in controlling the free cash flow agency problem?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhang, Yilei |
Published in: |
Financial management. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0046-3892, ZDB-ID 186034-3. - Vol. 38.2009, 3, p. 507-541
|
Subject: | Cash Flow | Cash flow | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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