Are elections debt brakes? Evidence from French municipalities

We show that voters are fiscal conservatives, although in the long run only: while the average (over the mandate) level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection. As the negative impact becomes larger as the debt level becomes higher, it compensates for the short run effect. Elections thus appear as a disciplining device, even if a weak one.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Cassette, Aurélie ; Farvaque, Etienne
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 122.2014, 2, p. 314-316
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Debt \| Elections \| Municipalities \| Political business cycle

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures ; H74 - State and Local Borrowing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743689